think that the Western Allies should themselves be prepared to make sacrifices to render this possible. We are, however, not yet certain that this is the case ; we have an open mind on the subject. We think it possible that technical difficulties of communications by sea and rail, lack of communications on the Russian Front, the character of bridges, inadequate facilities for training personnel, and the strategic disadvantages of a greatly extended front already alluded to, may possibly be so serious in their cumulative effect as to prevent a full use being put to the guns given to Russia. These, however, are matters primarily for the Russian Conference, and I will not detain the present Conference with them further.

15. With regard to the Balkans, the British and French Governments are in agreement, in principle, that:—

> (ce) The Allies should continue to hold Monastir and the line at present occupied, as long as this can be done without exposing the forces to defeat.
>
> Meanwhile a shorter line should be prepared for occupation, in case of need, which will enable the force to hold its own against any attack which may be made.[53]

(Adj. *disagreement about reinforcements have invited*) To meet the danger to the Salonika force, the French Government have decided to send two divisions, and the British

Government
Ior Sdomka ^ examine the possibility of sending
two divisions.

16. Practical considerations render it extremely
difficult for us to comply with this request. The
transport of troops from Great Britain to Salonika